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Abstract
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic inter-
actions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be
computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that 1) demonstrates NP-hardness
of determining whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist, and 2) demon-
strates the #P-hardness of counting Nash equilibria (or connected sets of Nash equilibria).
We also show that 3) determining whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists
is NP-hard, and that 4) determining whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in
a stochastic (Markov) game is PSPACE -hard even if the game is invisible (this remains
NP-hard if the game is finite). All of our hardness results hold even if there are only two
players and the game is symmetric.
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IRI-9703122, Grant IIS-9800994, ITR IIS-0081246, and ITR IIS-0121678.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; game theory; computational complexity; noncooperative
game theory; normal form game; stochastic game; Markov game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium;
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1 Introduction
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic inter-
actions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be
computed [47]. There has been growing interest in the computational complexity of natu-
ral questions in game theory. Starting at least as early as the 1970s, complexity theorists
have focused on the complexity of playing particular highly structured games (usually board
games, such as chess or Go [26], but also games such as Geography or QSAT [48]). These
games tend to be alternating-move zero-sum games with enormous state spaces, which can
nevertheless be concisely represented due to the simple rules governing the transition be-
tween states. As a result, effort on finding results for general classes of games has often
focused on complex languages in which such structured games can be concisely represented.
Real-world strategic settings are generally not nearly as structured, nor do they gener-
ally possess the other properties (most notably, zero-sumness) of board games and the like.
Algorithms for analyzing this more general class of games strategically are a necessary com-
ponent of sophisticated agents that are to play such games. Additionally, they are needed
by mechanism designers who have (some) control over the rules of the game and would like
the outcome of the game to have certain properties, such as maximum social welfare.
Noncooperative game theory provides languages for representing large classes of strategic
settings, as well as sophisticated notions of what it means to ”solve” such games. The best
known solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium [31], where the players’ strategies are
such that no individual player can derive any benefit from deviating from its strategy. The
question of how complex it is to construct such an equilibrium has been dubbed “a most
fundamental computational problem whose complexity is wide open” and “together with
factoring, [...] the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P today” [38].
While this question remains open, important concrete advances have been made in de-
termining the complexity of related questions. For example, 2-person zero-sum games can
be solved using linear programming [27] in polynomial time. As another example, deter-
mining the existence of a joint strategy where each player gets expected payoff at least k in
a team game in extensive form is NP-complete (as the number of players grows) [6]. As
yet another example, in 2-player general-sum normal form games, determining the existence
of Nash equilibria with certain properties is NP-hard [13]. Finally, the complexity of best-
responding and of guaranteeing payoffs in repeated and sequential games has been studied
in [5, 20, 37, 51].
In this paper we provide new complexity results on questions related to Nash equilibria.
In Section 2 we provide a single reduction which significantly improves on many of Gilboa
and Zemel’s results on determining the existence of Nash equilibria with certain properties.
In Section 3, we use the same reduction to show that counting the number of Nash equilibria
(or connected sets of Nash equilibria) is #P-hard. In Section 4 we show that determining
whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists is NP-hard. Finally, in Section 5
we show that determining whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a stochastic
(Markov) game is PSPACE -hard even if the game is invisible (this remains NP-hard if the
game is finite). All of our hardness results hold even if there are only two players and the
game is symmetric.
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2 Equilibria with certain properties in normal form
games
When one analyzes the strategic structure of a game, especialy from the viewpoint of a
mechanism designer who tries to construct good rules for a game, finding a single equilibrium
is far from satisfactory. More desirable equilibria may exist: in this case the game becomes
more attractive, especially if one can coax the players into playing a desirable equilibrium.
Also, less desirable equilibria may exist: in this case the game becomes less attractive. Before
we can make a definite judgment about the quality of the game, we would like to know the
answers to questions such as: What is the game’s most desirable equilibrium? Is there a
unique equilibrium? If not, how many equilibria are there? Algorithms that tackle these
questions would be useful both to players and to the mechanism designer.
Furthermore, algorithms that answer certain existence questions may pave the way to
designing algorithms that construct a Nash equilibrium. For example, if we had an algorithm
that told us whether there exists any equilibrium where a certain player plays a certain
strategy, this could be useful in eliminating possibilities in the search for a Nash equilibrium.
However, all the existence questions that we have investigated turn out to be NP-hard.
These are not the first results of this nature; most notably, Gilboa and Zemel provide some
NP-hardness results in the same spirit [13]. We provide a single reduction which in demon-
strates (sometimes stronger versions of) most of their hardness results, and interesting new
results. Additionally, as we show in Section 3, the reduction can be used to show #P-
hardness of counting the number of equilibria.
To begin, we need some standard defintions from game theory.
Definition 1 In a normal form game, we are given a set of agents A, and for each agent i,
a strategy set Σi and a utility function ui : Σ1 × Σ2 × . . .× Σ|A| → ℜ.
Definition 2 A mixed strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over Σi. A special
case of a mixed strategy is a pure strategy, where all of the probability mass is on one element
of Σi.
Definition 3 (Nash [31]) Given a normal form game, a Nash equilibrium (NE) is vector
of mixed strategies, one for each agent i, such that no agent has an incentive to deviate from
its mixed strategy given that the others do not deviate. That is, for any i and any alternative
mixed strategy σ′i, we have E[ui(s1, s2, . . . , si, . . . , s|A|)] ≥ E[ui(s1, s2, . . . , s
′
i, . . . , s|A|)], where
each si is drawn from σi, and s
′
i is drawn from σ
′
i.
Now we are ready to present our reduction.
Definition 4 Let φ be a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form. Let V be its set of
variables (with |V | = n), L the set of corresponding literals (a positive and a negative one
for each variable)1, and C its set of clauses. The function v : L → V gives the variable
1Thus, if x1 is a variable, x1 and −x1 are literals. We make a distinction between the variable x1 and
the literal x1.
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corresponding to a literal, e.g. v(x1) = v(−x1) = x1. We define G(φ) to be the following
symmetric 2-player game in normal form. Let Σ ≡ Σ1 = Σ2 = L ∪ V ∪ C ∪ {f}. Let the
utility functions be specified as follows:
• u1(l1, l2) = u2(l2, l1) = 1 for all l1, l2 ∈ L with l1 6= −l2;
• u1(l,−l) = u2(−l, l) = −2 for all l ∈ L;
• u1(l, x) = u2(x, l) = −2 for all l ∈ L, x ∈ Σ− L;
• u1(v, l) = u2(l, v) = 2 for all v ∈ V , l ∈ L with v(l) 6= v;
• u1(v, l) = u2(l, v) = 2− n for all v ∈ V , l ∈ L with v(l) = v;
• u1(v, x) = u2(x, v) = −2 for all v ∈ V , x ∈ Σ− L;
• u1(c, l) = u2(l, c) = 2 for all c ∈ C, l ∈ L with l /∈ c;
• u1(c, l) = u2(l, c) = 2− n for all c ∈ C, l ∈ L with l ∈ c;
• u1(c, x) = u2(x, c) = −2 for all c ∈ C, x ∈ Σ− L;
• u1(f, f) = u2(f, f) = 0;
• u1(f, x) = u2(x, f) = 1 for all x ∈ Σ− {f}.
Theorem 1 If (l1, l2, . . . , ln) (where v(li) = xi) satisfies φ, then there is a Nash equilibrium
of G(φ) where both players play li with probability
1
n
, with expected utility 1 for each player.
Furthermore, the only other Nash equilibrium is the one where both players play f , and
receive expected utility 0 each.
Proof: We first demonstrate that these combinations of mixed strategies indeed do con-
stitute Nash equilibria. If (l1, l2, . . . , ln) (where v(li) = xi) satisfies φ and the other player
plays li with probability
1
n
, playing one of these li as well gives utility 1. On the other hand,
playing the negation of one of these li gives utility
1
n
(−2)+ n−1
n
(1) < 1. Playing some variable
v gives utility 1
n
(2 − n) + n−1
n
(2) = 1 (since one of the li that the other player sometimes
plays has v(li) = v). Playing some clause c gives utility at most
1
n
(2−n)+ n−1
n
(2) = 1 (since
one of the li that the other player sometimes plays occurs in clause c, since the li satisfy
φ). Finally, playing f gives utility 1. It follows that playing any one of the li that the other
player sometimes plays is an optimal response, and hence that both players playing each of
these li with probability
1
n
is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, both players playing f is also a
Nash equilibrium since playing anything else when the other plays f gives utility −2.
Now we demonstrate that there are no other Nash equilibria. If the other player always
plays f , the unique best response is to also play f since playing anything else will give utility
−2. Otherwise, given a mixed strategy for the other player, consider a player’s expected
utility given that the other player does not play f . (That is, the probability distribution
over the other player’s strategies is proportional to the probability distribution constituted
by that player’s mixed strategy, except f occurs with probability 0). If this expected utility
is smaller than 1, the player is strictly better off playing f (which gives utility 1 when the
other player does not play f , and also performs better than the original strategy when the
other player does play f). So this cannot happen in a Nash equilibrium.
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There are no Nash equilibria where one player always plays f but the other does not,
so suppose both players play f with probability less than one. Consider the expected social
welfare (E[u1 + u2]), given that neither player plays f . It is easily verified that there is no
outcome with social welfare greater than 2. Additionally, any outcome in which one player
plays an element of V or C has social welfare strictly below 2. It follows that if either player
ever plays an element of V or C, the expected social welfare given that neither player plays f
is strictly below 2. By linearity of expectation it follows that the expected utility of at least
one player is strictly below 1 given that neither player plays f , and by the above reasoning,
this player would be strictly better off playing f instead of its randomization over strategies
other than f . It follows that no element of V or C is ever played in a Nash equilibrium.
So, we can assume both players only put positive probability on strategies in L ∪ {f}.
Then, if the other player puts positive probability on f , playing f is a strictly better response
than any element of L (since both give utility 1 if the other player plays an element of L,
but f does better if the other player plays f). It follows that the only equilibrium where f
is ever played is the one where both players always play f .
Now we can assume that both players only put positive probability on elements of L.
Suppose that for some l ∈ L, the probability that a given player plays either l or −l is less
than 1
n
. Then the expected utility for the other player of playing v(l) is strictly greater than
1
n
(2−n)+ n−1
n
(2) = 1, and hence this cannot be a Nash equilibrium. So we can assume that
for any l ∈ L, the probability that a given player plays either l or −l is precisely 1
n
.
If there is an element of L such that player 1 puts positive probability on it and player
2 on its negation, both players have expected utility less than 1 and would be better off
switching to f . So, in a Nash equilibrium, if player 1 plays l with some probability, player
2 must play l with probability 1
n
, and thus player 1 must play l with probability 1
n
. Thus
we can assume that for each variable, exactly one of its corresponding literals is played with
probability 1
n
by both players. It follows that in any Nash equilibrium (besides the one where
both players play f), literals that are sometimes played indeed correspond to an assignment
to the variables.
All that is left to show is that if this assignment does not satisfy φ, we do not have a
Nash equilibrium. Let c ∈ C be a clause that is not satisfied by the assignment, that is, none
of its literals are ever played. Then playing c would give utility 2, and both players would
be better off playing this.
Hence, there exists a Nash equilibrium in G(φ) where each player gets utility 1 if and only
if φ is satisfiable; otherwise, the only equilibrium is the one where both players play f and
each of them gets 0. Since any sensible definition of welfare optimization would prefer the
first kind of equilibrium, it follows that determining whether a “good” equilibrium exists is
hard for any such definition. Additionally, the first kind of equilibrium is, in various senses,
an optimal outcome for the game, even if the players were to cooperate, so even finding out
whether such an optimal equilibrium exists is hard. The following corollaries illustrate these
points (each corollary is immediate from Theorem 1).
Corollary 1 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
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exists a NE with expected (standard) social welfare (E[
∑
1≤i≤|A|
ui]) at least k, even when k is
the maximum social welfare that could be obtained in the game.
Corollary 2 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
exists a NE where all players have expected utility at least k, even when k is the largest
number such that there exists a distribution over outcomes of the game such that all players
have expected utility at least k.
Corollary 3 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
exists a Pareto-optimal NE. (A distribution over outcomes is Pareto-optimal if there is no
other distribution over outcomes such that every player has at least equal expected utility,
and at least one player has strictly greater expected utility).
Corollary 4 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
exists a NE where player 1 has expected utility at least k.
Some additional interesting corollaries are:
Corollary 5 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
is more than one Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 6 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
is an equilibrium where player 1 sometimes plays x ∈ Σ1.
Corollary 7 Even in symmetric 2-player games, it is NP-hard to determine whether there
is an equilibrium where player 1 never plays x ∈ Σ1.
All of these results indicate that it is hard to obtain summary information about a game’s
Nash equilibria. (Corollary 5 and weaker versions of Corollaries 2, 6 and 7 were first proven
by Gilboa and Zemel [13].)
3 Counting the number of equilibria in normal form
games
Existence questions do not tell the whole story. In general, we are interested in character-
izing all the equilibria of a game. One rather weak such characterization is the number of
equilibria2. We can use Theorem 1 to show that even determining this number in a given
normal form game is hard.
2The number of equilibria in normal form games has been studied both in the worst case [30] and in the
average case [29].
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Corollary 8 Even in symmetric 2-player games, counting the number of Nash equilibria is
#P-hard.
Proof: The number of Nash equilibria in our game G(φ) is the number of satisfying assign-
ments to the variables of φ, plus one. Counting the number of satisfying assignments to a
CNF formula is #P-hard [49].
It is easy to construct games where there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. In such games,
it would be more meaningful to ask how many distinct continuums of equilibria there are.
More formally, one can ask how many maximal connected sets of equilibria a game has (a
maximal connected set is a connected set which is not a proper subset of a connected set).
Corollary 9 Even in symmetric 2-player games, counting the number of maximal connected
sets of Nash equilibria is #P-hard.
Proof: Every Nash equilibrium in G(φ) constitutes a maximal connected set by itself, so the
number of maximal connected sets is the number of satisfying assignments to the variables
of φ, plus one.
The most interesting #P-hardness results are the ones where the corresponding existence and
search questions are easy, such as counting the number of perfect bipartite matchings. In the
case of Nash equilibria, the existence question is completely trivial: it has been analytically
shown (by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem) that a Nash equilibrium always exists [31]. The
complexity of the search question remains open.
4 Pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria
Equilibria in pure strategies are particularly desirable because they avoid the uncomfortable
requirement that players randomize over strategies among which they are indifferent [12].
In normal form games with small numbers of players, it is easy to determine the existence
of pure-strategy equilibria: one can simply check, for each combination of pure strategies,
whether it constitutes a Nash equilibrium. However, this is not feasible in Bayesian games,
where the players have private information about their own preferences (represented by
types). Here, players may condition their actions on their types, so the strategy space of
each player is exponential in the number of types.
In this section, we show that the question of whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equi-
librium exists is in fact NP-hard even in symmetric two-player games. First, we need the
standard definition of a Bayesian game and Bayes-Nash equilibrium from game theory.
Definition 5 In a Bayesian game, we are given a set of agents A; for each agent i, a set of
types Θi; a commonly known prior distribution φ over Θ1×Θ2×. . .×Θ|A|; for each agent i, a
set of strategies Σi; and for each agent i, a utility function ui : Θi×Σ1×Σ2× . . .×Σ|A| → ℜ.
6
Definition 6 (Harsanyi [15]) Given a Bayesian game, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE)
is a vector of mixed strategies, one for each pair i, θi ∈ Θi, such that no agent has an
incentive to deviate, for any of its types, given that the others do not deviate. That is, for
any i, θi ∈ Θi, and any alternative mixed strategy σ′i,θi, we have
Eθ−i|θi[E[ui(θi, s1,θ1, s2,θ2, . . . , si,θi, . . . , s|A|,θ|A|)]] ≥ Eθ−i|θi[E[ui(θi, s1,θ1, s2,θ2, . . . , s
′
i,θi
, . . . , s|A|,θ|A|)]]
where each si,θi is drawn from σi,θi, and s
′
i,θi
is drawn from σ′i,θi.
We can now define the computational problem that we study.
Definition 7 (PURE-STRATEGY-BNE) We are given a Bayesian game. We are asked
whether there exists a BNE where all the strategies σi,θi are pure.
To show our NP-hardness result, we will reduce from the SET-COVER problem.
Definition 8 (SET-COVER) We are given a set S = {s1, . . . , sn}, subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sm
of S with
⋃
1≤i≤m Si = S, and an integer k. We are asked whether there exist Sc1 , Sc2, . . . , Sck
such that
⋃
1≤i≤k Sci = S.
Theorem 2 PURE-STRATEGY-BNE is NP-hard, even in symmetric 2-player games where
φ is uniform.
Proof: We reduce an arbitrary SET-COVER instance to the following PURE-STRATEGY-
BNE instance. Let there be two players, with Θ ≡ Θ1 = Θ2 = {θ
1, . . . , θk}. φ is uniform.
Furthermore, Σ ≡ Σ1 = Σ2 = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm, s1, s2, . . . , sn}. The utility functions we choose
in fact do not depend on the types, so we omit the type argument in their definitions. They
are as follows:
• u1(Si, Sj) = u2(Sj , Si) = 1 for all Si and Sj;
• u1(Si, sj) = u2(sj , Si) = 1 for all Si and sj /∈ Si;
• u1(Si, sj) = u2(sj , Si) = 2 for all Si and sj ∈ Si;
• u1(si, sj) = u2(sj , si) = −3k for all si and sj ;
• u1(sj, Si) = u2(Si, sj) = 3 for all Si and sj /∈ Si;
• u1(sj, Si) = u2(Si, sj) = −3k for all Si and sj ∈ Si.
We now show the two instances are equivalent. First suppose there exist Sc1 , Sc2, . . . , Sck
such that
⋃
1≤i≤k Sci = S. Suppose both players play as follows: when their type is θi, they
play Sci. We claim that this is a BNE. For suppose the other player employs this strategy.
Then, because for any sj, there is at least one Sci such that sj ∈ Sci, we have that the
expected utility of playing sj is at most
1
k
(−3k) + k−1
k
3 < 0. It follows that playing any of
the Sj (which gives utility 1) is optimal. So there is a pure-strategy BNE.
On the other hand, suppose that there is a pure-strategy BNE. We first observe that in
no pure-strategy BNE, both players play some element of S for some type: for if the other
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player sometimes plays some sj, the utility of playing some si is at most
1
k
(−3k)+ k−1
k
3 < 0,
whereas playing some Si instead guarantees a utility of at least 1. So there is at least one
player who never plays any element of S. Now suppose the other player sometimes plays
some sj. We know there is some Si such that sj ∈ Si. If the former player plays this Si,
this will give it a utility of at least 1
k
2 + k−1
k
1 = 1 + 1
k
. Since it must do at least this well
in the equilibrium, and it never plays elements of S, it must sometimes receive utility 2. It
follows that there exist Sa and sb ∈ Sa such that the former player sometimes plays Sa and
the latter sometimes plays sb. But then, playing sb gives the latter player a utility of at most
1
k
(−3k) + k−1
k
3 < 0, and it would be better off playing some Si instead. (Contradiction.) It
follows that in no pure-strategy BNE, any element of S is ever played.
Now, in our given pure-strategy equilibrium, consider the set of all the Si that are played
by player 1 for some type. Clearly there can be at most k such sets. We claim they cover S.
For if they do not cover some element sj , the expected utility of playing sj for player 2 is 3
(because player 1 never plays any element of S). But this means that player 2 (who never
plays any element of S either) is not playing optimally. (Contradiction.) Hence, there exists
a set cover.
If one allows for general mixed strategies, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium always exists [12].
However, the question of how efficiently one can be constructed remains open.
5 Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in stochastic (Markov)
games
We now shift our attention from single-shot games to games with multiple stages. In each
stage, the players get to act and obtain payoffs. There has already been some research into
the complexity of playing repeated and sequential games. For example, determining whether
a particular automaton is a best response is NP-complete [5]; it is NP-complete to compute
a best-response automaton when the automata under consideration are bounded [37]; the
question of whether a given player with imperfect recall can guarantee itself a given payoff
using pure strategies is NP-complete [20]; and in general, best-responding to an arbitrary
strategy can even be noncomputable [51]. In this section, we present, to our knowledge, the
first PSPACE -hardness result on the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
A multi-stage game is typically represented as a stochastic (Markov) game, where there is
an underlying set of states, and the game shifts between these states from stage to stage [45,
46, 12]. At every stage, each player’s payoff depends not only on the players’ actions, but also
on the state. Furthermore, the probability of transitioning to a given state is determined by
the current state and the players’ current actions. Hardness results for such games cannot be
obtained simply by formulating a known hard game such as generalized Go [26] or QSAT [48]
as a Markov game, because such a formulation would have to specify an exponential number
of states. Even if the number of states is polynomial, one might suspect hardness due to the
fact that the strategy spaces are extremely rich. However, in this section we show PSPACE -
hardness even in a variant where the strategy spaces are simple (in the sense that the players
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cannot condition their actions on events in the game).
Definition 9 A stochastic (Markov) game consists of the following.
• A set of players A;
• A set of states S, among which the game transits;
• For each player i, a set of actions Σi that can be played in any state;
• A transition probability function p : S×Σ1×. . .×Σ|A|×S → [0, 1], where p(s1, a1, . . . , an, s2)
gives the probability of the game being in state s2 in the next stage given that the current
state of the game is s1 and the players play actions a1, . . . , an;
• For each player i, a payoff function ui : S×Σ1× . . .Σ|A| → ℜ, where ui(s, a1, . . . , a|A|)
gives the payoff to player i in state s where the players play actions a1, . . . , an;
• A discount factor δ such that the total utility of agent i is
∞∑
k=0
δkui(s
k, ak1, . . . , a
k
|A|),
where sk is the state of the game at stage k and the players play actions ak1, . . . , a
k
n in
stage k.
In general, a player need not always be aware of the current state of the game, the actions
the others played in previous stages, or the payoffs that the player has accumulated. In the
extreme case, players never find out any of these and are hence playing blindly. We call
such a Markov game invisible. It is relatively easy to specify a pure strategy in an invisible
Markov game, because there is nothing to condition on. Hence, such a strategy is “simply”
an infinite sequence of actions (for player i, a sequence {aki }, where it plays action a
k
i in stage
k, regardless).3 In spite of this apparent simplicity of the game, we show that determining
whether pure-strategy equilibria exist is extremely hard.
Definition 10 (PURE-STRATEGY-INVISIBLE-MARKOV-NE) We are given an
invisible Markov game. We are asked whether there exists a Nash equilibrium where all the
strategies are pure.
We show that this problem is PSPACE -hard, by reducing from PERIODIC-SAT, which
is known to be PSPACE -complete [36].
Definition 11 (PERIODIC-SAT) We are given a CNF formula φ(0) over the variables
{x01 . . . x
0
n} ∪ {x
1
1 . . . x
1
n}. Let φ(k) be the same formula, except that all the superscripts are
incremented by k. We are asked whether there exists a Boolean assignment to the variables
⋃
k=0,1,...{x
k
1 . . . x
k
n} such that φ(k) is satisfied for every k = 0, 1, . . ..
Theorem 3 PURE-STRATEGY-INVISIBLE-MARKOV-NE is PSPACE -hard, even when
the game is symmetric, 2-player, and the transition process is deterministic.
3We do not need to worry about issues of credible threats and subgame perfection in this setting, so we
can simply use Nash equilibrium as our solution concept [28].
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Proof: We reduce an arbitrary PERIODIC-SAT instance to the following symmetric 2-
player PURE-STRATEGY-INVISIBLE-MARKOV-NE instance. The state space is S =
{si}1≤i≤n ∪ {t1i,c}1<i≤2n;c∈C ∪ {t
2
i,c}1<i≤2n;c∈C ∪ {r}, where C is the set of clauses in φ(0).
Furthermore, Σ ≡ Σ1 = Σ2 = {t, f} ∪ C. The transition probabilities are as follows:
• p(si, x1, x2, si+1(modn)) = 1 for 1 < i ≤ n and all x
1, x2 ∈ Σ;
• p(s1, b1, b2, s2) = 1 for all b1, b2 ∈ {t, f};
• p(s1, c, b, t12,c) = 1 for all b ∈ {t, f} and c ∈ C;
• p(s1, b, c, t22,c) = 1 for all b ∈ {t, f} and c ∈ C;
• p(s1, c1, c2, r) = 1 for all c1, c2 ∈ C;
• p(tji,c, x
1, x2, tji+1,c) = 1 for all 1 < i < 2n, j ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ C, and x
1, x2 ∈ Σ;
• p(tj2n,c, x
1, x2, r) = 1 for all j ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ C, and x1, x2 ∈ Σ;
• p(r, x1, x2, r) = 1 for all x1, x2 ∈ Σ.
Some of the utilities obtained in a given stage are as follows (we do not specify utilities
irrelevant to our analysis):
• u1(si, x1, x2) = u2(si, x2, x1) = 0 for 1 < i ≤ n and all x1, x2 ∈ Σ;
• u1(s1, b1, b2) = u2(s1, b2, b1) = 0 for all b1, b2 ∈ {t, f};
• u1(s1, c, b) = u2(s1, b, c) = 1 for all b ∈ {t, f} and c ∈ C, when setting variable x01 to b
does not satisfy c;
• u1(s1, c, b) = u2(s1, b, c) = −1 for all b ∈ {t, f} and c ∈ C, when setting variable x
0
1 to
b does satisfy c;
• u1(s1, c1, c2) = u2(s1, c2, c1) = −1 for all c1, c2 ∈ C;
• u1(t1kn+i,c, x, b) = u2(t
2
kn+i,c, b, x) = 0 for k ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, all c ∈ C and b ∈ {t, f}
such that setting variable xki to b does not satisfy c, and all x ∈ Σ;
• u1(t1kn+i,c, x, b) = u2(t
2
kn+i,c, b, x) = −4 for k ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, all c ∈ C and
b ∈ {t, f} such that setting variable xki to b does satisfy c, and all x ∈ Σ;
• u1(t1kn+i,c, x, c
′) = u2(t
2
kn+i,c, c
′, x) = 0 for k ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, all c, c′ ∈ C, and all
x ∈ Σ.
Additionally, the game played in state r is some symmetric zero-sum game without a
pure-strategy equilibrium (for example, a generalization of rock-paper-scissors) with very
small payoffs. Finally, the discount factor is δ = (1
2
)
1
2n+1 (so that δ2n > 1
2
).
We start our analysis with a few observations. First, there can be no pure-strategy
equilibrium in which state r is reached at some point, because (since r is an absorbing state)
this would require that some pure-strategy equilibrium of the game in state r were played
whenever state r occurred. (Otherwise a player who is not best-responding in one of these
stages could simply switch to a best response in this stage, and because the game is invisible,
the rest of the game would remain unaffected, so this would give higher utility.) But such an
equilibrium does not exist. Second, if we ever reach one of the tji,c states, we will inevitably
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reach state r at some point after this. It follows that all pure-strategy Nash equilibria never
leave the si states.
Now suppose an assignment satisfying the periodic SAT formula exists. Let both players
play as follows: in stage kn + i (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n), b ∈ {t, f} is played, where b is the value
that the variable xki is set to. Clearly, both players receive utility 0 with these strategies.
Does either player have an incentive to deviate? The only deviation of any significance is
to play some c ∈ C when the current state is s1. So, without loss of generality (because
of the symmetry of the game), say player 2 deviates to playing c ∈ C in stage kn + 1
(when the state is s1). We know that in the satisfying assignment, some variable x
l
i among
xk1, . . . , x
k
n, x
k+1
1 , . . . , x
k+1
n is set to some b such that setting x
l−k
i to b satisfies c. If it is x
k
1,
which is set to b, then in stage kn + 1 player 1 plays b, and player 2 gets payoff −1 in
this stage since we are in state s1 and setting x
0
1 to b satisfies c. Otherwise, if it is x
l
i with
l = k + 1 or i 6= 1, which is set to b, then player 2 will get payoff 1 in stage kn + 1, but in
stage ln + i player 1 plays b, and player 2 gets payoff −4 in this stage since we are in state
t2(l−k)n+i,c and setting x
l−k
i to b satisfies c. The discounting is insignificant enough that this
more than cancels out the 1 earned in stage kn+1. Player 2 will get (at most) 0 in the other
stages up to the first stage in state r, and given that we made the payoffs in the game in
state r sufficiently small relative to δ, player 2 will not earn enough in the remaining stages
to cancel out its losses so far. So there is no incentive to deviate. Thus, a pure-strategy NE
exists.
On the other hand, suppose that no assignment satisfying the periodic SAT formula ex-
ists. Let us investigate whether a Nash equilibrium could exist. We know that in such a
Nash equilibrium we never leave the si, so both players receive utility 0, and no c is ever
played in a stage with state s1. Since playing a c in one of the other stages can have no
deterrent value, we may suppose that only elements of {t, f} are played. Now consider the
following assignment to the xki : if player 1 plays b in stage kn + i, x
k
i is set to b. Since no
assignment satisfying the periodic SAT formula exists, we know there is some clause c and
some k such that no variable xli among x
k
1 , . . . , x
k
n, x
k+1
1 , . . . , x
k+1
n is set to some b such that
setting xl−ki to b satisfies c. But then, if player 2 deviates to play this c in stage kn+1, it will
receive payoff 1 in this stage, and payoff 0 in all the remaining stages up to the first stage in
state r. Furthermore, player 2 can guarantee itself at least payoff 0 in each stage in state r,
as this state corresponds to a zero-sum symmetric game. It follows that this deviation gives
player 2 positive utility and is hence beneficial. Thus, no pure-strategy NE exists.
A simpler version of the same argument shows a weaker form of hardness for the case
where the game is restricted to have only finitely many stages (we omit the proof due to
limited space):
Theorem 4 PURE-STRATEGY-INVISIBLE-MARKOV-NE is NP-hard, even when the
game is symmetric, 2-player, the transition process is deterministic, and the number of stages
in the game is finite.
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6 Conclusions and future research
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic inter-
actions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be
computed.
In this paper, we provided a single reduction that 1) demonstrates NP-hardness of deter-
mining whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist, and 2) demonstrates
the #P-hardness of counting Nash equilibria (or connected sets of Nash equilibria). We
also showed that 3) determining whether a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists is
NP-hard, and that 4) determining whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a
stochastic (Markov) game is PSPACE -hard even in invisible games (and remains NP-hard
if the game is finite). All of our hardness results hold even if there are only two players and
the game is symmetric.
The intersection of computer science and economics is a fertile research area, and has
many exciting avenues for future research. For example, within the area of computational
complexity, there are open questions regarding the complexity of executing various mech-
anism optimally (e.g., [4, 42, 43, 16]) or approximately (e.g. [33, 25]), the complexity of
manipulating various mechanisms (e.g., [3, 2, 9, 44]), the complexity of designing mech-
anisms (that lead to desirable outcomes) [10, 40], and the complexity of deciding what
information to elicit from the players in various mechanisms [11]. Another avenue involves
studying more sophisticated equilibrium notions which take into account that players have
limited memory (e.g. [32, 41, 1, 14, 39]) or limited capability to solve optimization problems
(e.g. [23, 24, 19, 34]). There are also open issues on communication complexity in games
(e.g., [35, 7, 8, 17, 50]), and on the complexity of computing general equilibria (“market
equilibria”) (e.g., [50]) and other solutions.
There are numerous open research questions even in the area of computing solutions to
noncooperative games. Some recent work has focused on novel knowledge representations
which, in certain settings, can drastically speed up equilibrium finding (e.g. [21, 18, 22]). One
avenue of future theoretical work includes identifying restricted classes of games for which
equilibria (or equilibria with certain properties) can be found fast. Another avenue involves
studying the complexity of characterizing (some of) the equilibria of a game partially. Yet
another avenue includes analyzing the computational complexity of other solution concepts
from noncooperative game theory.
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